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This paper empirically investigates the effects of institutional and macroeconomic policy 
stance variables on current account deficits (CAD). Based on cross-section data for a 
broad number of developing and industrial countries, the results strongly suggest that 
better governance increases whilst the presence of original sin decreases the ability of an 
economy  to  sustain  CAD.  Exchange  rate  flexibility  and  openness  appear  to  put  a 
discipline on CAD. Consistent with the equity home bias and Feldstein-Horioka puzzle, 
CAD  decrease  with  country  size.  The  net  impacts  of  the  financial  deepening  and 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The  determinants  of  current  account  deficits  (CAD)  are  now  at  the 
centre of international macroeconomics with the recent experience of large 
imbalances  of  a  number  of  countries  including  the  U.S.  The  empirical 
literature appears to focus on the determinants and sustainability of CAD in 
individual countries or the consequences of it in a cross-section of countries. 
One  strand  of  the  literature  focuses  on  the  theory  and  empirics  of  the 
intertemporal  approach  to  the  balance  of  payments  (Obstfeld  and  Rogoff, 
1995) according to which CAD is the outcome of forward-looking dynamic 
saving  and  investment  decisions  (Ventura,  2003  and  Nason  and  Rogers, 
2003).  A related literature considers the Feldstein and Horioka (1980) puzzle 
of persistent saving-investment correlation (the very small size of CAD) in 
spite  of  policy  regime  changes  towards  international  capital  mobility  and 
flexible exchange rates  (Coakley, Fuertes and Spagnolo, 2004; Özmen and 
Parmaksız, 2003 and Taylor, 2003). The recent experience of the U.S. with 
high  deficits  appears  to  be  spawning  the  literature  on  CAD  sustainability 
(Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2004). Another strand of the literature focuses on the 
causes and consequences of CAD reversals or sudden stops especially in 
developing countries (Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi, 2003 and Edwards, 2004).  
Despite their potentially crucial importance in determining the ability of a 
country  to  sustain  a  CAD,  macroeconomic  policy  stance  and  institutional 
variables  are  considered  by  only  a  very  limited  number  of  studies  with 
Calderon, Chong and Loayza (2002) and Chinn and Prasad (2003) providing 
two  of  the  most  recent  exceptions.  The  objective  of  this  paper  is  to 
investigate  empirically  the  roles  of  such  variables  including  “original  sin”, 
exchange  rate  regimes,  rule  of  law,  financial  development  and  monetary 
credibility in determining the current account positions of a broad number of 
industrial and developing countries.   
The  present  international  financial  system  allows  only  a  very  small 
number of countries to borrow in their own currencies internationally. This 
fact is referred to as “original sin” by Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999). 
Original  sin  has  crucially  important  theory  and  policy  implications.  As 
Eichengreen et al. (2003) and Hausmann and Panizza (2003) convincingly 
argue, original sin can lead to financial fragility, greater output and capital 
flow  volatility,  lower  credit  ratings,  and  limited  ability  to  implement  an 
independent monetary policy. Obstfeld (2004) notes that original sin leads to 
a harsher macroeconomic adjustment  process. All these  and  the fact that 
liability dollarization increases the country’s vulnerability to sudden stops in 
capital flows (Calvo et al. 2003) can plausibly lead to many countries to be 
more prudent about CAD. Thus, the presence of original sin can decrease 
the ability countries to sustain high levels of CAD.  
Exchange rate regime flexibility can increase the capacity of a country 
to  accommodate  external  shocks  (Milesi-Ferretti  and  Razin,  1996  and 
Edwards, 2004). Fixed exchange rate regimes can lead to high and often 
unsustainable CAD due to real exchange rate appreciation. Exchange rate 
flexibility,  on  the  other  hand,  can  act  as  a  disciplining  device  on  CAD  by 
allowing exchange rates to adjust to CAD disequilibrium.    3 
Country size plays an important role in international finance as recently 
argued by Martin and Rey (2004). The menu of financial assets is wider in 
larger countries leading to a higher equity home bias. Higher equity home 
bias, in  turn, means that the bulk of domestic  saving is retained home to 
finance investment, leading to a lower saving-investment gap and hence a 
lower CAD.  
The  level  of  financial  development  is  important  both  on  savings  and 
investments, and thus on CAD. The  net  effect of it, however, may not be 
unambiguous.  According  to  McKinnon  and  Shaw  postulation  financial 
deepening can increase both saving and investment via efficient allocation of 
resources.  Financial  development  and  integration  leads  to  higher  CAD 
according to Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) as it increases consumption via 
loosening  liquidity  constraints  and  allowing  for  consumption  smoothening. 
The  net  impact  of  financial  development  on  CAD  thus  appears  to  be  an 
empirical issue as noted by Chin and Prasad (2003).  
In the absence of a credible monetary policy framework, we may expect 
that inflation is high and real exchange rate is more volatile. The lack of a 
monetary policy credibility may correspond also to a higher degree of real 
exchange rate misalignment and thus to a lower level of sustainable CAD. A 
credible  monetary  policy  can  be  expected  not  to  let  aggregate  demand 
deviate  substantially  and  systematically  from  the  level  consistent  with  the 
inflation target. In this context, monetary credibility can act as a disciplining 
device on CAD by responding to aggregate demand shocks. However, the 
overall impact of monetary credibility and price stability on CAD may not be 
unambiguous  as  it  can  also  lead  to  higher  investment  and  saving  via 
decreasing uncertainty and better resource allocation.  
The importance of institutions and governance is well established in the 
growth literature (Rodrik, 2004 and Kaufmann, 2004) but yet to be explicitly 
considered  in  studies  on  CAD.  Better  governance  and  institutions  can 
increase the ability of countries to sustain higher levels of CAD at least via 
promoting foreign direct investments. In the same context, better governance 
and institutions can decrease equity home bias abroad as recently argued by 
Ahearne, Griever and Warnock (2004), and hence increase CAD.  
Countries that are more open to international trade can be expected to 
have larger export sectors enabling them to service external debt more easily 
and sustaining a higher level of CAD. According to Milesi-Ferretti and Razin 
(1996)  a  more  open  economy  is  more  vulnerable  to  external  shocks. 
Openness, on the other hand, can make adjustment to sudden stops less 
painful (Calvo et al., 2003 and Edwards, 2004). The net effect of openness 
on CAD appears to be ambiguous as noted by Calderon et al. (2002, p. 3).   
 
II. DATA AND MEASUREMENT ISSUES 
We consider the following measure of original sin (OSIN) for country i 
developed by Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2003a,b) based on the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) data on the stock of  international 
debt securities:    4 
max 1 ,0 Securities in currency i
Securities issued by country i
i OSIN
￿ ￿
= - ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
 
For country i, OSINi is zero if all the securities are issued in its own currency 
and 1 if they are issued in foreign currency.  
For the level of financial development (FIN_DEV) we use the ratio of 
liquid liabilities to GDP as a proxy variable.  As noted by Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt, and Levine (2000) this is the broadest available indicator of financial 
intermediation and a typical measure of financial depth.  For rule of law and 
governance, we consider the rule of law (RL) index compiled by Kaufmann, 
Kraay  and  Mastruzzi  (2003).  The  RL  index  ranges  from  around  –2.5  to 
around 2.5 with higher or positive value indicate greater rule of law and better 
governance. 
The conventional classification of exchange rate regimes is provided by 
the IMF which is “de iure” that is, it is essentially based on what the countries 
say that they do. However, actual behaviour may be substantially different 
from the announced one, therefore it may be preferable to consider de facto 
regimes rather than the de jure ones. In this study, exchange rate regime 
(ERR)  variable  is  based  on  the  de  facto  exchange  rate  classification  by 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) classifies de facto 
exchange rate regimes on a 1—14 scale, with higher values denoting more 
flexible exchange arrangements.   
We use the log of the IMF quota as a proxy for each country’s economic 
SIZE. As noted by IMF (2003, p.1) “a member’s quota is broadly determined 
by  its  economic  position  relative  to  other  members”  and  “a  variety  of 
economic factors is considered in determining changes in quotas, including 
GDP, current account transactions, and official reserves”.   
Inflation  rate  (INF)  can  be  interpreted  as  an  indicator  of  the  lack  of 
monetary  credibility.  Thus,  monetary  credibility  variable  (MON_CRED)  is 
proxied as the negative of log(INF). The degree of openness to international 
trade  (OPEN)  is  defined  as  the  ratio  of  imports  plus  exports  over  the 
country’s GDP.   
The sample size for the study is effectively restricted by the availability 
of original sin (OSIN) measures provided by Eichengreen et al. (2003). As it 
appears to be highly persistent with an extremely limited time variation, we 
consider the 1999-2001 average values of OSIN. Consequently, we consider 
the  1999-2001  averages  of  CADY  (CAD/GDP),  OSIN,  ERR,  OPEN  and 
FIN_DEV.  We use the 2000 values of RL and the 1993-2001 average of 
MON_CRED (taking into account the fact that gaining credibility takes time).  
All the data except OSIN, RL, SIZE, and ERR are from the World Bank World 
Development Indicators data base. The data for OSIN, RL, SIZE and ERR 
are from Eichengreen et al. (2003), Kaufmann et al. (2003), IMF(2003) and 
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III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 1 reports the results of the models to explain the cross-country
1 
evolution of current accounts where the dependent variable (CADY) is the 
ratio of CAD over GDP.  It may plausibly be argued that the macroeconomic 
policy stance variables are potentially endogenous for the evolution of CAD. 
We  address  the  simultaneity  issue  by  estimating  the  equation  also  by 
Generalized  Instrumental  Variable  Estimation  (GIVE)  method.  The  second 
column of Table 1 reports the GIVE results with the instrument set containing 
OSIN93-98,  CAD93-98,  OPEN93-98,  ERR93-98,  FIN_DEV93-98,  LGDP93-98, 
MON_CRED93-98, SIZE, RL where the subscripts denote the sample period 
averages of the corresponding variables and LGDP is the log. of the PPP 
based  GDP.  The  Sargan  test  for  the  equation  support  the  validity  of  the 
instrument set. The estimated equations in the table pass all the diagnostics 
suggesting  their  empirical  validity.  The  results  by  the  OLS  and  GIVE  are 
essentially the same for all the variables except MON-CRED supporting that 
the OLS coefficients are not significantly attenuated by a simultaneity bias.   
The presence of original sin appears to restrict the ability of countries to 
sustain CAD as suggested by the significant and negative coefficient of OSIN 
in the equations. The lack  of international  markets to  borrow in  their  own 
currencies can be interpreted as leading the bulk of countries to be more 
prudent about CAD to avoid a harsher macroeconomic adjustment process. 
Redemption from original sin needs a new international financial system as 
argued by Eichengreen et al. (2003). A decrease in the degree of original sin 
increases the ability of countries to sustain higher CAD. Thus, the reform of 
the international financial system to allow complete markets for currencies of 
countries  with  sound  institutions  and  macroeconomic  conditions  can  be 
expected to promote also international trade.  
Better  governance and institutions increase the ability of countries to 
sustain  higher  levels  of  CAD  as  suggested  by  the  significant  positive 
coefficient of RL in the equations. This result is consistent with an argument 
that  better  governance  promotes  foreign  direct  investments  and  growth 
(Kaufmann,  2004).  Furthermore,  better  governance  and  institutions  in  a 
country  can  decrease  equity  home  bias  abroad  (Ahearne,  Griever  and 
Warnock, 2004 and Greenspan, 2004) promoting foreign savings to finance 
domestic investments and thus increasing sustainable CAD
2.  
                                                            
1 The sample contains the following 79 countries: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, 
Bahrain,  Barbados,  Belgium,  Bolivia,  Brazil,  Bulgaria,  Canada,  Chile,  China,  Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech Rep., Denmark, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, India, 
Indonesia,  Ireland,  Israel,  Italy,  Jamaica,  Japan,  Jordan,  Kazakhstan,  Kenya,    Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway,  Pakistan,  Panama, Peru,  Philippines, Poland,  Portugal, Romania, 
Russia,  S.  Africa,  S.  Korea,  Singapore,  Slovakia,  Slovenia,  Spain,  Sri  Lanka,  Suriname, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, U.K., U.S., Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela.  
 
2 This result is quite consistent with Greenspan’s (2004, p. 4) interpretation of U.S. CAD 
as a result of decreasing home bias abroad: “The decline in home bias probably reflects an 
increased international tendency for financial systems to be more transparent, open, and 
supportive of strong investor protection. ... Accordingly, the trend of declining home bias and 
expanding international financial intermediation will likely continue. This process has enabled   6 
CAD  appear  to  decrease  as  the  relative  SIZE  of  the  economy 
increases. Consistent with the Feldstein and Horioka (1980) puzzle, domestic 
saving-investment  link  tends  to  be  stronger  in  larger  countries  leading  to 
lower CAD. This result  strongly  supports  also  Martin  and Rey (2004) that 
country  size  is  important  in  international  finance.  Furthermore,  larger 
countries can plausibly expected to have larger and potentially more efficient 
financial markets leading to a higher domestic saving retention ratio and thus 
lower CAD.  This result is consistent also with the view that the equity home 
bias, on average, increases with the country size. As already argued, better 
governance  can  decrease  equity  home  bias  abroad.  Considering  their 
relative size in international financial markets, smaller countries can therefore 
be expected to benefit more by having better governance enabling them to 
finance higher CAD.  
We  find  a  negative  and  significant  relationship  between  CAD  and 
exchange rate flexibility. The significance of the ERR coefficient improves in 
the GIVE equation consistent with the potential endogeneity of exchange 
rate regime for the evolution of CAD. The negative ERR coefficient strongly 
supports the argument that exchange rate flexibility acts as shock absorber 
or  a disciplining  device on CAD  by  allowing  exchange rates  to  adjust to 
CAD disequilibrium. This is a consistent result with Edwards (2004, p.1) that 
“countries  with  more  flexible  exchange  rate  regimes  are  able  to 
accommodate the shocks stemming from a reversal better than countries 
with more rigid exchange rate regimes”.  
Economies more open to international trade tend to have lower CAD 
supporting the view that openness can make countries more vulnerable to 
external  shocks  and  crises.  This  is  not  necessarily  inconsistent  with  the 
argument that openness can decrease the magnitude and pain of a real 
exchange rate adjustment to an external shock or sudden stop (Calvo et al., 
2003  and  Edwards,  2004).  However,  the  vulnerability  effect  itself,  rather 
than  pain  reducing  and  adjustment  smoothening  functions  of  openness 
appears to be the dominating factor for the fear of CAD.  
The  levels  of  financial  development  and  monetary  credibility  do  not 
significantly  affect  CAD.  The  insignificance  of  the  FIN_DEV  support  the 
view  that  financial  deepening  has  positive  impact  both  on  savings  and 
investments leading to a statistically neutral effect on the evolution of CAD.  
Monetary policy credibility can be expected to act as a disciplining device 
on  CAD  by  responding  to  aggregate  demand  shocks  not  to  led  them  to 
deviate systematically from the level consistent with the inflation target. The 
negative coefficient of MON-CRED in the OLS equation supports this view. 
However,  MON_CRED  becomes  insignificant  in  the  GIVE  equation 
consistent with its endogeneity for the evolution of CAD. The insignificance 
of MON_CRED for CAD is not surprising not only because of the potential 
offsetting effects of monetary credibility on saving and investment dynamics 
but also because of the fact that targeting inflation is much more a credible 
monetary policy framework than targeting current account.  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
the United States to incur and finance a much larger current account deficit than would have 
been feasible in earlier decades”.   
   7 
The estimated coefficient for CADY93-98 can broadly be interpreted as 
revealing a high degree of persistence in CAD. This persistence measure, 
albeit consistent with those obtained in similar studies such as Calderon et 
al.  (2003),  should  be  interpreted  with  a  caution  as  we  consider  only 
averages of two samples with different number of observations.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Current  account  deficits  vary  substantially  between  countries  as 
documented  by  Ventura  (2003)  and  Edwards  (2004).  The  results  of  this 
paper suggest that institutional and macroeconomic policy variables, which 
are often neglected in the empirical literature, indeed matter for the current 
account positions of a broad number of industrial and developing countries. 
The lack of international markets to borrow in their own currencies appears 
to lead the countries affected from original sin to be more prudent about 
CAD.  Better  governance,  on  the  other  hand,  increases  the  ability  of 
countries  to  sustain  higher  CAD.  Flexible  exchange  rate  regimes  and 
openness to international trade can be interpreted as to put a discipline on 
CAD by providing the necessary adjustment mechanisms. Larger countries 
with  higher  equity  home  bias  have  higher  saving-investment  correlations 
causing lower CAD.  Monetary credibility and financial development may be 
affecting  both  saving  and  investment  dynamics  positively  justifying  their 
statistical insignificance for CAD.  
   8 
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Table 1. The Determinants of Current Account Deficits 
 
 
  OLS    GIVE   
Constant  0.172**(4.56)  0.175** (3.80) 
OSIN  -0.044**  (-2.80)  -0.047**  (-2.20) 
ERR  -0.002* (-1.68)  -0.003** (-2.16) 
RL  0.018** (2.76)  0.017** (2.30) 
SIZE  -0.046** (-5.09)  -0.036** (-3.07) 
FIN_DEV  0.005 (0.96)  -0.012 (-0.77) 
MON_CRED  -0.021** (-2.36)  -0.017 (-1.44) 
OPEN  -0.036**(-3.90)  -0.034**(-3.10) 
CAD93-98  0.818**(6.61)  0.869**(6.17) 
Diagnostics  R
2 = 0.67, s.e = 0.034, DW = 2.16,  
￿
2
SC(1)  =  0.72[0.40],  ￿
2
RESET(1)  = 
0.80[0.37], ￿
2
HC(1) = 0.06[0.80] 
R
2 = 0.59,  RG
2 = 0.67, s.e = 0.038, 
DW  =  2.16,    ￿
2
SC(1)  =  0.64[0.42],  
￿
2
RESET(1)  =  1.04[0.31],  ￿
2
HC(1)  = 
0.14[0.71],   ￿
2
SARGAN(1) =0.06[0.80], 
Notes: The values in parentheses are the t-ratios. * and ** denote the significance at the 10 and 5 %, 
respectively.   RG
2 is the generalized R








SARGAN  denote ￿
2 
tests for the null of no serial correlation, no equation mis-specification, homoscedasticity and 
instrument set validity, respectively, with p-values given in [.]. See Pesaran and Pesaran (1997) for the 
test statistics and GIVE. 